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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1995 Supp.). Following transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(k) (1995 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. ISSUES FOR REVIEW. 
1. Did the District Court err in finding that Defendant and Appellant Roger T. 
Russell ("Russell") was not a "successor to the judgment debtor" within the meaning of 
Rule 690) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore lacked the capacity to redeem 
two parcels of real property (the "Subject Property") which Plaintiff and Appellee Mark L. 
Rindlesbach ("Rindlesbach") had purchased at a sheriffs sale? Russell raised this issue in 
the District Court in his memorandum in opposition to Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Opposition Memorandum"). (Rec. pp. 517-521.) 
2. Did Evan W. Hansen ("Evan") have apparent authority to act on behalf of 
Drew William Hansen ("Drew") and Diana M. Hansen ("Diana") when he entered into an 
oral agreement with Russell for the purchase of the Subject Property? Russell raised this 
issue in the District Court in his Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 521-523.) 
3. Did Drew and Diana ratify Evan's act of selling the Subject Property? Russell 
raised this issue in the District Court in his Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 523-526.) 
4. Is the oral agreement between Russell and Evan for the purchase of the 
Subject Property specifically enforceable? Russell raised this issue in the District Court in 
his Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 526-528.) 
5. Did the District Court err in finding that Russell's acts performed in reliance 
on the oral purchase agreement failed to meet the test of exclusive reference, i.e., that they 
would not have been performed had the contract not existed? Russell raised this issue in 
the District Court in his Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 528-529.) 
6. Did the District Court err in finding that Russell had no legitimate right or 
interest in the subject property? Russell raised this issue in the District Court in his 
Opposition Memorandum. (Rec. pp. 517-529). 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
This matter is on appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Mark L. Rindlesbach ("Rindlesbach") and against Russell. The issues for review 
set forth above involve whether a material fact exists with respect to Russell's ownership 
of, and interest in, the Subject Property and, therefore, whether the District Court properly 
entered summary judgment in favor of Rindlesbach. In reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party. 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 
1991). In deciding whether a district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law 
to the prevailing party, the appellate court reviews the judgment for correctness. Winegar 
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 1991). This standard is particularly appropriate 
to this action, in which the District Court ruled solely on the basis of affidavits filed in 
support of and in opposition to Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary Judgment and did not 
observe the demeanor, credibility or competency of witnesses. See Matter of Adoption of 
Infant Anonymous. 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 25, CHAPTER 5, STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property other than leases 
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over 
or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
TITLE 78, CHAPTER 37, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
78-37-6. Right of redemption — Sales by parcels — Of land and water stock. 
Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of 
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of 
sales under executions generally. In all cases where the 
judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of 
corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used or 
intended to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the court 
shall equitably apportion such water stock to the land, or some 
part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it may deem suitable 
for the sale thereof, and the land and water stock in each 
parcel shall be sold together, and for the purpose of such sale 
shall be regarded as real estate and subject to redemption as 
above specified. In all sales of real estate under foreclosure the 
court may determine the parcels and the order in which such 
parcels of property shall be sold. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 56(c). Summary Judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
RULE 69Q) (1)- Redemption of real property from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to 
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be redeemed by 
the following persons or their successors in interest: (A) the 
judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having a lien by judgment, 
mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or on some share 
or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was 
sold. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves Russell's asserted right to redeem the Subject Property in his 
capacity as the successor in interest to Drew and Diana, who were the judgment debtors 
in this case and the former owners of the Subject Property. On November 18, 1993, 
Rindlesbach, who had acquired the beneficiary's interest in a trust deed encumbering the 
Subject Property and other property, filed a Complaint seeking judicial foreclosure of the 
trust deed. On January 6, 1994, Russell filed an Answer to Rindlesbach's Complaint, as 
well as a Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third-Party Complaint, in an attempt to protect his 
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asserted interest in the Subject Property. On February 17, 1994, Rindlesbach filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the relief sought in his complaint and dismissal of 
Russell's Counterclaim. On June 23, 1994, the District Court entered its Order Granting 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Rindlesbach and also entered a Decree 
of Foreclosure on all of the property subject to Rindlesbach's foreclosure action, including 
the Subject Property. 
Following entry of the Decree of Foreclosure and an Order of Sale, Rindlesbach 
purchased the Subject Property at a sheriffs sale conducted on August 2, 1994, paying 
$88,000.00 for the parcels comprising the Subject Property. 
Six months later, on February 2, 1995, Russell filed his Petition for Determination 
of Entitlement to Redeem the Subject Property and, pursuant to a Stipulation and Joint 
Motion Respecting Redemption, Russell paid to the Court the redemption price for the 
Subject Property, $93,280.00. Twenty days later, on February 22, 1995, Rindlesbach 
commenced a new action, this time seeking to quiet title to the foreclosed property. On 
March 21, 1995, the foreclosure action and the quiet title action were consolidated under 
the consolidated civil number 930906701. On May 9, 1995, Rindlesbach filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment against defendants other than Russell. On 
December 22,1995, the District Court entered its Order on PlaintifPs Motion for Judgment 
Against Various Defendants, by which it granted Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Default Judgment. On August 11, 1995, Rindlesbach filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Russell. On December 22, 1995, the District Court granted 
PlaintifPs Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Russell. Also on December 
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22, 1995, the District Court entered its Jud .?,ent and Decree Quieting Title in the Subject 
Property. On January 18, 1996, Russell filed his Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Before December 1987, Evan and his spouse, Geneva, held fee title to certain 
real property located at approximately 1815 East Creek Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
consisting of approximately 3.53 acres designated in six separate parcels, which included 
the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 414, 415, 487, 488.) 
2. On November 30, 1987 and December 7, 1987, Evan and Geneva conveyed 
their Creek Road property to Drew and Diana by Quit Claim Deed. (Rec. pp. 415, 487, 
488.) 
3. Drew and Diana acquired their interest in the Creek Road property in order 
to enable Drew to collateralize a loan (the "Loan") from Capital City Bank (the "Bank") for 
a business venture which later failed. The loan was evidenced by a Trust Deed Note (the 
"Note") secured by Trust Deed (the "Trust Deed") which, at commencement of this action, 
encumbered property which included the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 418, 512, 533, 546, 
547, 553.) 
4. When Drew became unable to repay the Loan, Dale Hansen ("Dale") (Drew's 
brother), David Hansen (another brother), and Brook Hansen ("Brook") (Dale's son) all 
made payments in Drew's behalf in an effort to save the property which their parents had 
conveyed to Drew and Diana. (Rec. pp. 512, 547, 553.) 
5. Russell, who for many years had been a friend of Evan, also made several 
payments on the Loan to assist Evan. (Rec. pp. 512, 534.) 
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6. In the spring of 1991, Evan, who had negotiated with at least two other 
potential buyers, asked Russell to buy the Subject Property. While Russell was not initially 
interested because he was experiencing financial difficulties following his wife's liver 
transplant, he finally reached an agreement with Evan in 1991 to purchase the Subject 
Property. The total purchase price was to be $115,000.00 and consisted of the following 
components: $10,000.00 down; $15,000.00 to be paid by January 1, 1992; delinquent 
property taxes of approximately $6,000.00 to be paid by Russell; and the Loan balance of 
approximately $84,000.00 to be paid in monthly installments by Russell. In addition, 
Russell agreed to grant Evan and Geneva a life estate in a portion of the Subject Property 
which included their home. (Rec. pp. 513, 534.) 
7. Evan had his nephew, defendant Merrill G. Hansen ("Merrill"), prepare a 
written contract to memorialize their agreement. The contract generally reflected the 
parties' oral agreement. Russell did not sign it because he was experiencing creditor 
difficulties at the time and did not want to jeopardize the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 513, 
534, 535.) 
8. Evan told both Brook and Dale that he had sold the Subject Property to 
Russell. During the year or so beginning in August 1992, talk of the Subject Property and 
of Russell's purchase dominated virtually every one of the many conversations among 
Brook, Drew, Evan and Merrill. (Rec. pp. 513, 547, 553.) 
9. After Russell and Evan reached their agreement, Russell paid every monthly 
installment of the Loan from April 1991 through June 1993, generally making the 
payments to Evan. The total Russell paid to the Bank (or to Evan for payment of the 
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Loan) was approximately $26,000.00. Russell also paid $8,000.00 as a part of the down 
payment and brought property taxes current by paying $7,688.92. Russell did not pay the 
full cash payments within the time required by the oral agreement, but Evan allowed 
Russell to make those payments late in light of Russell's financial circumstances. (Rec. pp. 
513, 514, 535.) 
10. Russell took possession of the Subject Property in May 1991, and immediately 
moved his own horses on to the Subject Property and exercised total control of the barn 
and pastures. He paid water fees on the Subject Property, stored vehicles on it, mended 
fences, cleaned up and maintained the Subject Property, hired help to clean the stalls, and 
rented the Subject Property to others for horse pasturage. He would not have rented the 
Subject Property from Evan to pasture his horses, since he had other property for that 
purpose. Consistent with the life estate which Russell had granted to Evan and Geneva, 
they continued to live in their home on a portion of the Subject Property, and Evan 
volunteered to care for the horses. Except for storing an old car on a portion of the 
Subject Property which Evan occupied, Drew and his family have not occupied the Subject 
Property since Russell took possession. (Rec. pp. 514, 536.) 
11. On numerous occasions, Drew acknowledged his understanding and 
acceptance of Russell's oral purchase agreement. For example: (a) Drew often became 
visibly upset about Russell's delinquencies in payment of Loan payments and property 
taxes; (b) on several occasions, he said that he could sell the Subject Property to 
Rindlesbach, his boss, since Russell had no written contract; (c) when confronted by Dale 
in July 1992, Drew stated in essence: "When Roger gets delinquent and Capital City is 
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ready to foreclose, Rindlesbach can come in"; (d) he made no effort to deter Russell from 
making Loan payments in Drew's behalf; (e) on one occasion when Russell made a 
delinquent payment, Drew informed him that he would continue to honor Russell's 
purchase agreement; (f) on another occasion, Drew threatened Russell that if Russell did 
not bring the delinquent taxes current, Drew would sell the Subject Property to 
Rindlesbach (Russell brought the taxes current); and (g) in the late spring or early summer 
of 1993, Evan told Brook that Merrill and Drew had come up with an idea to categorize 
Russell's payments as "rent" and to disavow Russell's entitlement to the Subject Property. 
Evan said that he would not stand for what they were doing because it would be ridiculous 
to pay rent of $1,000.00 per month for the Subject Property as horse pasture; however, 
he later acknowledged that the plan to squeeze Russell out was a "done deal," but that out 
of the proceeds from Rindlesbach, Evan would pay Russell back for what Russell had paid 
under the purchase agreement. (Rec. pp. 514, 515, 536, 537, 547, 548, 554.) 
12. But for the existence of the purchase agreement, Russell would not have 
made any of the payments, nor would he have conducted any maintenance of the Subject 
Property. He never intended that any payment be construed as a loan, as a rental 
payment, or as anything other than partial performance of his purchase obligation. He has 
been ready, willing and able to fulfill all of his obligations under the purchase agreement. 
(Rec. pp. 515, 537.) 
13. On or about August 10, 1993, Rindlesbach, as buyer, and Drew, Diana and 
Evan, collectively as sellers, entered into an earnest money sales agreement by which Drew, 
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Diana and Evan agreed to sell to Rindlesbach five parcels, including the Subject Properly. 
(Rec. pp. 415, 417.) 
14. Closing of the sale under the earnest money agreement was conditioned upon 
Rindlesbach's clearance of title to the property, including the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 
418.) 
15. On August 16, 1993, Russell recorded his Notice of Interest in the Subject 
Property in the official records of Salt Lake County, Utah, as Entry No. 5579822, in Book 
6731, at Page 2762. He supplemented the notice with a Correction Notice of Interest 
recorded on August 17, 1993, as Entry No. 5581629, in Book 6733, at Page 1352. (Rec. 
pp. 420.) 
16. On or about October 26, 1993, Rindlesbach purchased the Note and the 
beneficiary's interest in the Trust Deed from the Bank. (Rec. pp. 418.) 
17. On November 18,1993, Rindlesbach initiated a judicial foreclosure action on 
the Trust Deed Property by filing a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, styled 
Mark L. Rindlesbach v. Drew William Hansen, et al.. Civil No. 930906701 (the "Foreclosure 
Action"). (Rec. pp. 418, 419.) 
18. On June 23,1994, the District Court entered an order granting Rindlesbach's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a Decree of Foreclosure in the Foreclosure 
Action. (Rec. pp. 419.) 
19. On August 2,1994, pursuant to an Order of Sale, Rindlesbach purchased the 
property encumbered by the Trust Deed at a sheriffs sale for $98,036.11, of which 
$88,000.00 was allocated to the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 419.) 
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20. On or about November 17,1994, Drew and Diana executed Quit Claim Deeds 
by which they quit claimed the Subject Property and other property to Rindlesbach. (Rec. 
pp. 419, 496.) 
21. On or about December 2, 1994, Drew and Diana executed an Assignment of 
Redemption Rights, assigning to Rindlesbach all of their rights to redeem the Subject 
Property and other property from the August 2, 1994 sheriffs sale. (Rec. pp. 419.) 
22. On February 2, 1995, Russell filed his Petition for Determination of 
Entitlement to Redeem the Subject Property. (Rec. pp. 319-327, 421.) 
23. Within the redemption period, Russell paid into the Third Judicial District 
Court the full amount of the $93,280.00 redemption price for the Subject Property (subject 
to stipulated augmentation for 1994 property taxes if Rindlesbach provided evidence of 
payment). (Rec. pp. 516.) 
24. Rindlesbach's claims against each of the defendants in this case other than 
Russell have been resolved. (Rec. pp. 421.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a successor in interest to Drew and Diana, the judgment debtors in this case, 
Russell has the right to redeem the Subject Property under Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-6 
(1992) and Rule 69(j)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Russell succeeded to the interest 
of Drew and Diana in the Subject Property when he purchased the Subject Property from 
Evan. Russell became the owner of the Subject Property under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion because as the purchaser of the Subject Property, Russell acquired the equitable 
interest in the Subject Property at the moment his purchase agreement with Evan became 
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fully enforceable. The doctrine of equitable conversion applies to Russell's purchase of the 
Subject Property even though Russell dealt with Evan and not Drew and Diana, and even 
though Russell and Evan did not reduce the agreement to writing, because (1) Evan 
consummated the agreement with Russell as the agent for Drew and Diana, (2) Russell 
could bring an action for specific performance, and (3) Russell satisfied the statute of 
frauds by partly performing under the oral agreement. 
Evan had apparent authority to act for Drew and Diana when he entered into the 
agreement with Russell because Drew and Diana knowingly permitted Evan to act for them 
and manifested their consent to his exercise of that authority. Acting in good faith, Russell 
reasonably believed that Evan possessed such authority, and Russell changed his portion 
in detrimental reliance upon Evan's apparent authority. Further, even if Evan did not have 
apparent authority to act for Drew and Diana, Drew and Diana ratified Evan's act of selling 
the Subject Property to Russell by accepting the benefits of Russell's act and failing to 
disaffirm the agreement between Evan and Russell. 
The agreement between Evan and Russell is specifically enforceable because its 
terms were both sufficiently certain that Evan and Russell knew what was required of them 
and definite enough that the courts could delineate their intent. Further, Russell has 
tendered the purchase price for the Subject Property to Rindlesbach and has averred his 
ability, readiness and willingness to fulfill all of his agreed obligations pursuant to the 
purchase agreement. 
Russell partly performed the purchase agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds by 
making payments under the purchase agreement, possessing the Subject Property, 
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maintaining and improving the Subject Property, and even renting pasturage to others, all 
in accordance with the clear and definite terms of the purchase agreement. Russell also 
acted in reliance on the agreement and would not have performed as he did had the 
agreement not existed. The failure of Evan, Drew and Diana to perform under the 
agreement would have resulted in fraud on Russell because Russell relied to his detriment 
on Evan's promise to sell the Subject Property, and damages would not compensate Russell 
for loss of the Subject Property. 
Each of the legal arguments stated above finds ample factual support in the 
affidavits which Russell filed in opposition to Rindlesbach's summary judgment motion. 
The trial court committed reversible error by failing to find that those affidavits created 
material issues of fact which precluded summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
RUSSELL, THE SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE JUDGMENT DEBTORS, 
MAY REDEEM THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS ITS OWNER UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION 
Utah's right of redemption statute provides that "[s]ales of real estate under 
judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of 
sales under executions generally." Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-6 (1993 Supp.). Those who 
may redeem property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold separately, include "the 
following persons or their successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor 
having a lien by judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part 
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was sold." Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j)(l) 
(emphasis added). Russell redeemed the Subject Property as a successor in interest to 
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Drew and Diana, the judgment debtors. A successor in intere,. to a judgment debtor is 
defined as "the one who has acquired or succeeded to the interest of the judgment debtor 
in the property... ." Forty-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 East Broadway, 135 
Ariz. 265, 660 P.2d 866, 868 (Ct. App. 1982). Russell succeeded to the interest of Drew 
and Diana in the Subject Property when he purchased the Subject Property on contract in 
April 1991 and became its owner pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion. 
"The doctrine of equitable conversion provides that 'an enforceable executory 
contract of sale [upon which an action for specific performance could be brought] has the 
effect of converting the interest of the vendor of real property to personalty.'" Lach v. 
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Willson v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1972)). The purchaser of real property 
under the doctrine of equitable conversion "acquires the equitable interest in the property 
at the moment the contract is created and is therefore treated as the owner of the land." 
Lach, 746 P.2d at 805. In short, the purchaser of real property "has an equitable interest 
in the property while the seller's interest is 'converted to the right to receive the proceeds 
under the contract of sale.'" Lach, 746 P.2d at 805 (quoting Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 
396, 393 P.2d 791, 792 (1964)) (emphasis in original). 
An Arizona case with facts strikingly similar to those of this case shows that Russell, 
as the successor in interest to Drew and Diana, was entitled to redeem the Subject Property 
under the doctrine of equitable conversion. See Forty-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. 
v. 4400 East Broadway. 135 Ariz. App. 265, 666 P.2d 866 (1982). In Forty-Four Hundred, 
the trial court had held that a contract buyer of real estate was the successor in interest 
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to the judgment debtor/mortgagor in a foreclosure action brought by the holder of the 
underlying mortgage. The court had ruled that the buyer's assignee was entitled to redeem 
at any time within six months of the date of the foreclosure sale. IcL at 868. The appellate 
court affirmed, explaining that "the vendee under a binding contract for sale of realty is the 
owner and the vendor merely holds the legal title as personalty in trust for the vendee until 
the latter completes his performance." IcL Significantly, the court then explained that the 
"purpose of the statutory right of redemption for a successor in interest is to protect his 
interest as owner of the property in question." IcL The court confirmed this right even 
though the contract buyer was in default at the time of foreclosure. 
Likewise in this case, Russell was entitled to redeem the Subject Property under the 
doctrine of equitable conversion as successor in interest to Drew and Diana, even if Russell 
was in default under his purchase agreement at the time of foreclosure (which he denies). 
Russell became the owner of the Subject Property at the moment the agreement became 
fully enforceable. The doctrine of equitable conversion applies to Russell's purchase of the 
Subject Property even though Russell dealt with Evan and not Drew and Diana when he 
entered into the agreement, and even though Russell and Evan did not reduce the 
agreement to writing, because (1) Evan consummated the agreement as the agent for Drew 
and Diana, (2) Russell could bring an action for specific performance, and (3) Russell 
satisfied the statute of frauds by partly performing under the agreement. 
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A. Evan Acted As The Agent For Drew And Diana When He Entered Into The 
Agreement With Russell. 
1. Evan had apparent authority to act for Drew and Diana. 
Implicit in the District Court's ruling that Russell was not the successor to Drew and 
Diana is the District Court5s reliance on Drew's affidavit, which flatly stated that he never 
authorized Evan to act as his agent to sell the Subject Property. Standing alone, that 
affidavit would undoubtedly have sustained a finding that Evan lacked actual authority. 
But Russell's summary judgment defense did not rely on actual authority. Instead, the 
affidavits of Russell, Brook and Dale which Russell filed with the District Court showed 
that regardless of the extent of his actual authority, Evan had apparent authority to sell to 
Russell. At the least, those affidavits created an issue of fact which precluded summary 
judgment, because "even though an agent is not actually authorized by the principal, the 
principal may nevertheless be liable to a third party based on the doctrine of apparent 
authority." Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204, 208-09 (Utah 1993). Apparent 
authority has been defined as "conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, 
causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his 
behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Luddington, 855 P.2d at 209. See also 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983) ("Apparent authority 
exists . . . where a person has created such an appearance of things that it causes a third 
party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party has the power to act on 
behalf of the first person . . . ."). The following elements must be established to show 
apparent authority: 
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(1) that the principal has manifested his [or her] consent to 
the exercise of such authority or has knowingly permitted the 
agent to assume the exercise of such authority; (2) that the 
third person knew of the facts and, acting in good faith, had 
reason to believe, and did actually believe, that the agent 
possessed such authority; and (3) that the third person, relying 
on such appearance of authority, has changed his [or her] 
position and will be injured or suffer loss if the act done or 
transaction executed by the agent does not bind the principal. 
Luddington. 855 P.2d at 209. 
The Russell, Dale and Brook affidavits abundantly established each of these 
elements. The facts drawn from those affidavits are that during the time that Drew and 
Diana were absolutely unable to make payments on the Loan, and thus would have faced 
foreclosure without assistance, (1) Evan continued to live on the Subject Property, (2) 
Evan and other family members made payments on the Loan, (3) Evan negotiated with at 
least two potential buyers other than Russell, (4) Evan negotiated with Russell to sell the 
Subject Property, and (5) Evan had Merrill prepare a written contract with Russell which 
named Evan and Geneva as sellers. There is no evidence that Drew and Diana objected to 
any of Evan's activities and transactions. It is reasonable to infer that Drew and Diana 
consented to the exercise of Evan's authority in selling the Subject Property and knowingly 
permitted Evan to assume the exercise of that authority. 
Moreover, there is no evidence to contradict the proposition that Russell acted in 
good faith and had reason to believe, and did actually believe, that Evan had the authority 
to sell the Subject Property. Russell accepted this appearance of authority and changed his 
position in reliance on it by actually possessing the Subject Property, making payments on 
the Loan as required under the agreement, making improvements to the Subject Property, 
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and even paying taxes on the Subject Property. See, e.g., McFadden v. Wilder, 6 Ariz. App. 
60, 429 P.2d 694, 698 (1967) ("Equitable conversion could be found to have taken place 
when the parties made their agreement. Plaintiff, who had been tenant on the property 
to that point, made improvements, paid taxes, and no longer paid rent.,!). Indeed, Russell 
stands to lose roughly $40,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenditures alone — every penny of 
which benefitted Drew and Diana and no one else — if Evan's sale of the Subject Property 
does not bind Drew and Diana. The District Court's failure to recognize Evan's apparent 
authority was reversible error. 
2. Drew and Diana ratified Evan's act of selling the Subject Property. 
"A principal may impliedly or expressly ratify an agreement made by an 
unauthorized agent. Ratification of an agent's acts relates back to the time the 
unauthorized act occurred and is sufficient to create the relationship of principal and 
agent." Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982). Ratification requires that the 
principal "have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify." IcL However, "a 
purported principal may not be wilfully ignorant, nor may he purposely shut his eyes to 
means of information within his possession and control and thereby escape ratification 'if 
the circumstances are such that he could reasonably have been expected to dissent unless 
he were willing to be a party to the transaction.'" IcL (quoting Moses v. Archie McFarland 
&Son. 119 Utah 602, 230 P.2d 571, 573-74 [1951]). 
Ratification is particularly evident when a principal accepts the benefits of a 
previously unauthorized act. See, e.g.. Corral v. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., 129 Ariz. 
333, 630 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1981) ("Acceptance of the benefit of an unauthorized act of 
-18-
one purporting to act as an agent amounts to ratification."); First Nat* 1 Bank in Miles City 
v. Nunn. 628 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Mont. 1981) ("It is well-settled that a principal who 
accepts the benefits of an agency transaction cannot later deny there was an agency. 
[Citation omitted.] Even if the agent's actions were unauthorized, the principal ratifies 
them by receiving the benefits and is estopped to deny the agency."); C.H. Stuart, Inc. v. 
Bennett. 617 P.2d 879, 885 (Okla. 1980) ("One who accepts the benefits of the 
unauthorized acts of his agent ratifies the acts and accepts all the burdens and benefits of 
the acts. It is not essential to ratification that the principal have knowledge of the acts of 
the agent if the benefits from the acts are retained after the happening of such events as 
would place a reasonably prudent person on inquiry."). 
Even if Evan acted without the authorization of Drew and Diana under a theory of 
apparent agency, Drew and Diana1 ratified the agreement between Evan and Russell. As 
reflected by the affidavits of Russell, Dale and Brook, Drew and Diana knew that Evan had 
sold the Subject Property to Russell. As the owners of the Subject Property, Drew and 
Diana benefitted from Evan's sale of the Subject Property to Russell because Russell's 
payments reduced the Loan balance and brought taxes current. Not surprisingly, Drew and 
Diana expressed their willingness to be part of the transaction by failing to disaffirm the 
agreement. See Bradshaw. 649 P.2d at 78. See also Ulibarri Landscaping Materials. Inc. 
v. Colony Materials. Inc.. 97 N.M. 266, 639 P.2d 75, 79 (Ct. App. 1981) ("One may infer 
affirmance by a principal of an unauthorized transaction of its agent from the principal's 
The parties' affidavits were silent about Diana's role, but since the benefits of Russell's agreement with 
Evan flowed to her just as they did to Drew, it is reasonable to infer that Drew's acts of ratification were 
intended to bind both marriage partners and had her consent or acquiescence. 
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failure to repudiate it."); Paragano v. Gray, 126 Or. App. 670, 870 P.2d 837, 842 (1994) 
("Intent to ratify may be implied from the principal's neglecting promptly to disavow the 
agent's act."). Finally, and perhaps most important, Drew spoke often of Russell's 
agreement and sought ways to get out of it, not to repudiate it. The compelling conclusion 
from the affidavits is that Drew and Diana intended to ratify Evan's acts and are estopped, 
under all of the circumstances, from denying their agency relationship with Evan after 
benefitting from Evan's acts and failing to repudiate the agreement. 
Because Evan acted as the agent of Drew and Diana, Drew and Diana were bound 
by Evan's sale of the Subject Property to Russell. "It is well established in the law that a 
principal is liable for the acts of his agent within the scope of the agent's authority, 
irrespective of whether the principal is disclosed or undisclosed." Garland v. Fleischmann, 
831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). The fact that Evan acted in his own 
name without disclosing the identities of Drew and Diana "does not preclude liability on 
the part of the principal when he is discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt 
with the agent." Id. Significantly, "[t]his is true even though the third person dealing with 
the agent did not learn of the existence of the principal until after the bargain was 
completed." Id. 
B. The Oral Agreement Between Russell And Evan Is Specifically Enforceable. 
Russell contends that the parties entered into an oral contract to convey an interest 
in the Property. It is well settled that "[w]here the existence of an oral contract and the 
terms thereof are contested and the evidence is conflicting, it is for the trier of fact to 
determine whether the contract did in fact exist and, if so, the terms of such contract." 
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Curran v. Hastreiter. 579 P.2d 524, 526 (Alaska 1978). Because Russell intends to 
introduce evidence at trial showing that the agreement is specifically enforceable and 
satisfies the statute of frauds, the District Courf s order and judgment should be reversed 
and the case remanded to allow the trier of fact to determine whether the parties did in 
fact enter into the agreement and, if so, the terms of that agreement. 
"Before specific performance will be employed by the courts to enforce a contract 
the terms of the agreement must be reasonably certain so the parties know what is 
required of them, and definite enough that the courts can delineate the intent of the 
contracting parties." Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980). See also Eliason 
v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 429 (Ut. 1980) ("Specific performance of contract depends on 
whether the obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient clarity and definiteness 
that the contract can be performed according to its terms."). Further, "in a suit for specific 
performance of a contract for the sale of realty, the purchaser must show that he paid the 
purchase price, or tendered it, to the defendant prior to commencement of the suit. 
However, an action for specific performance may also be maintained if the plaintiff presents 
an excuse for his failure to make such payment or tender and avers his ability, readiness 
and willingness to pay the contract amount." Reed. 610 P.2d at 1379. 
The terms of the agreement between Russell and Evan were definite and certain, and 
the proposed written document between the parties, although never signed, clearly 
evidenced the intent of the parties to consummate the transaction. Russell and Evan 
specifically described the realty which Russell agreed to purchase. Evan agreed to sell the 
Subject Property to Russell for $115,000.00, and their agreement required Russell to make 
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monthly payments of $1,000.00 for application to the Loan. Russell did in fact make over 
two years' worth of monthly payments under the agreement and also paid $8,500.00 in 
cash and $7,688.92 to bring property taxes current as required by the agreement. 
Although Russell has not paid the entire purchase price, Russell has paid the full 
redemption amount into court and has averred his ability, readiness and willingness to 
fulfill all of his agreed obligations. These facts alone show that the agreement is certain 
and definite enough to be specifically enforceable. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has made clear that "the proper application of [the rule 
that the essential terms of the contract must be definite] is as a shield to protect from 
injustice, and not as a weapon with which to work an injustice." Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 
612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980). Even though the parties' agreement was never reduced 
to a signed document, its essential terms have never been disputed. To avoid injustice to 
Russell, the agreement should be upheld. 
C. Russell's Part Performance Of The Oral Agreement Satisfies The Statute Of 
Frauds. 
Utah's statute of frauds provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by 
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995). A statutory limitation on the harshness of this rule is 
the doctrine of part performance: 
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Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge 
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of 
agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1995). 
The standards of sufficient performance are as follows: 
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; 
second, the acts done in performance of the contract must be 
equally clear and definite; and third, the acts must be in 
reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such 
that a) they would not have been performed had the contract 
not existed, and b) the failure to perform on the part of the 
promisor would result in fraud on the performer who relied, 
since damages would be inadequate. 
Martin v. ScholL 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). Russell's performance, as presented to 
the District Court in his affidavit, met each of these standards. First, as shown above, the 
agreement between Russell and Evan and its terms were clear and definite enough to be 
specifically enforceable. Second, Russell's acts — including payment of about $40,000.00, 
possession of the Property, maintenance and improvement of it, and even his rental of 
pasturage to others — were clear and definite. Third, Russell acted in reliance on the 
agreement and absolutely would not have performed as he did had the agreement not 
existed. Finally, Evan's failxire to perform under the agreement would have resulted in 
fraud on Russell because (a) Russell relied to his detriment on Evan's promise to sell the 
Property, and (b) damages would not compensate Russell for loss of the Subject Property 
as a unique asset. 
It is understood that ,f[r]eliance may be made in innumerable ways, all of which 
could refer exclusively to the contract." Id. In this case, Russell had the option to keep his 
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horses elsewhere, but chose to keep his horses on the Subject Property because he owned 
it. Moreover, Russell had no reason to improve the Subject Property except that he owned 
the Subject Property and wanted to improve its utility and appearance. Further, both 
Russell and Evan acknowledged that payment of $1,000.00 per month for rent would be 
absurd. Finally, Russell allowed Evan and his wife to stay on the Subject Property by 
conveying a life estate interest to Evan, with Russell retaining the fee simple interest in the 
Subject Property. All of these acts exclusively refer to the purchase agreement. Russell 
was the owner of the Subject Property and not merely Evan's tenant. 
In a remarkably similar case, the Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that a 
party's part performance of an oral modification to a written escrow agreement saved the 
oral modification from violating the statute of frauds. See George Fisher. Jr. Family Inter 
Vivos Revocable Trust v. Fisher. 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In Fisher. 
the appellees purchased real property pursuant to a written escrow agreement. The parties 
later orally modified the agreement's payment terms to allow the appellees to invest the 
money in the property rather than make the required payments. During this time the 
appellees had taken possession of the property and had improved it by installing sprinkling 
systems, cleaning and grading the land, and installing ponds. When the oral modification 
to the written escrow agreement was challenged in court as violating the statute of frauds, 
the trial court found that the appellees' partial performance upheld the modification: 
The contract was partially performed and [appellees] relied 
upon the oral representations. The improvements were 
substantial and valuable. The decision to invest in the 
property rather than make payments was exclusively referable 
to the oral modification. The Court believes that [appellees] 
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changed positions by performing on the oral modification so 
that it would now be inequitable to permit [appellants] to 
found their claim for breach on the original agreement as 
unmodified. 
Id. at 46. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, recognizing that "in reliance on 
the oral modification, appellees changed their position and partially performed the 
contract," and that "it would be inequitable to permit [appellants] to enforce the 
unmodified agreement." Id. 
Like the appellees in Fisher, Russell changed his position in reliance on his oral 
agreement with Evan and partially performed the agreement by taking possession of the 
Subject Property and making improvements to the Subject Property. Indeed, Russell's 
actions in taking possession of the Subject Property and improving it, including mending 
fences and cleaning up and maintaining the Subject Property, are essentially the same as 
the appellees' actions in Fisher. Accordingly, Russell's substantial past performance of the 
agreement satisfies the statute of frauds and compels enforcement of the agreement. 
Russell's affidavit opposing summary judgment described his part performance in 
detail. At the least, his affidavit created a material issue of fact which should have been 
reserved for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
In granting Rindlesbach's motion for summary judgment, the District Court ruled 
that Russell was not a "successor to the judgment debtor" and therefore lacked the 
statutory capacity to redeem the Subject Property from the sheriffs sale. The District Court 
also ruled that Russell's acts in reliance on the oral purchase contract failed to meet the 
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test of exclusive reference. The District Court simply could not have made those legal 
determinations without ignoring the opposing affidavits of Russell, Dale and Brook, since 
those affidavits contained facts which, if true, would compel precisely the converse result. 
The District Court's failure to consider the opposing affidavits in a light most favorable to 
Russell constituted reversible error. Accordingly, Russell requests the following relief: 
1. That the District Court's Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Against Defendant Russell be reversed; 
2. That the District Court's Judgment and Decree Quieting Title in the Subject 
Property in favor of Rindlesbach and against Russell be reversed; and 
3. That the action be remanded to the District Court, where Russell may be 
accorded a trial on the merits. 
DATED this / ? tf day of August, 1996. 
JARDINE, UNEBAUGH & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
William G. Marsden 
John N. Brems 
Jeffery J. Devashrayee 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
Roger T. Russell 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK L. RINDLESBACH, 
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vs. 
Court of Appeals No. 960219-CA 
ROGER T. RUSSELL: DREW WILLIAM 
HANSEN and DIANA M. HANSEN; EVAN 
W. HANSEN, individually and as Personal 
Representative for the Estate of GENEVA 
B. HANSEN; and BANK ONE, N.A., fka 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Priority 15 
N.A., 
Defendants and Appellant. 
MARK L. RINDLESBACH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ROGER T. RUSSELL, aka ROGER T. 
RUSSELL. DDS; DREW WILLIAM 
HANSEN, aka DREW W. HANSEN, and 
DIANA M. HANSEN; GUARDIAN STATE 
BANK; SMALL BUSINESS ADMINIS-
TRATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA; UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, as Custo-
dian of the Assets for TRACY-COLLINS 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY and TRACY 
MORTGAGE COMPANY; MERRILL G. 
HANSEN, aka MERRILL HANSEN; 
KATHLEEN HANSEN; DARRELL 
DALTON; UTAH STATE TAX COM-
MISSION; and EVAN W. HANSEN, indi-
vidually and as Personal Representative 
for the Estate of GENEVA B. HANSEN, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
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FILSO RSSTFJCT COfeflT 
Third Judicial Oiuuict 
OCT J» 1995 
SALUTE COUNTY 
By- / Deputy Cterfc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK L. RINDLESBACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN and 
DIANA M. HANSEN, et al., 
Defendants. 
MARK L. RINDLESBACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER T. RUSSELL, also known 
as ROGER T. RUSSELL, DDS, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 930906701 
The court previously granted in part plaintiff7s motion for 
summary judgment. The court, however, reserved ruling as to parcel 
No. 4. The court now rules that plaintiff is entitled to summary 
judgment as to parcel No. 4 for the reasons set forth in 
plaintiff's memorandum and as expressed at the hearing. 
RINDLESBACH V. HANSEN PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff's counsel is to submit a proposed judgment pursuant to 
Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this / day of October, 1995, 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
RINDLESBACH V. HANSEN PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this_ _day of 
October, 1995: 
T. Richard Davis 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
900 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
William G. Marsden 
John N. Brems 
Attorneys for Roger T. Russell 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David O. Black 
Attorney for Defendants Hansen 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
T. RICHARD DAVIS (A0836) 
900 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FJIS3 5eSTr?5T ZGmT 
Third Jud;c;ai District 
DEC 2 2 1995 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By *-*^7,s/r//. JrrnM 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
MARK L. RINDLESBACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN and 
DIANA M. HANSEN; EVAN W. 
HANSEN, individually and as 
Personal Representative for 
the Estate of GENEVA B. 
HANSEN; ROGER T. RUSSELL; 
and BANK ONE, N.A., formerly 
known as VALLEY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, N.A., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT RUSSELL 
Consolidated 
Civil No. 930906701 
Judge Michael Murphy 
* * * * * * * 
MARK L. RINDLESBACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER T. RUSSELL, also known 
as ROGER T. RUSSELL, DDS; 
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN, also 
known %s DREW W. HANSEN, and 
DIANA M. HANSEN; GUARDIAN 
STATE BANK; SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA; UTAH ) 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ) 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, as ) 
Custodian of the Assets for ) 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK & TRUST ) 
COMPANY and TRACY MORTGAGE ) 
COMPANY; MERRILL G. HANSEN, ) 
also known as MERRILL ) 
HANSEN; KATHLEEN HANSEN; ) 
DARRELL DALTON; UTAH STATE ) 
TAX COMMISSION; and EVAN W. ) 
HANSEN, individually and as ) 
Personal Representative for ) 
the Estate of GENEVA B. ) 
HANSEN, ) 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on September 11, 1995 
at the hour of 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff being represented by his 
attorney of record, T. Richard Davis of the firm Callister 
Nebeker & McCullough; Defendant Roger T. Russell being 
represented by his attorneys of record, William G. Marsden, 
and John N. Brems of the firm Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & 
Dunn; and Defendants Drew W. Hansen, Diana M. Hansen, 
Merrill G. Hansen, and Evan W. Hansen were represented by 
their attorney of record, David O. Black of the firm Black, 
Stith & Argyle; the Court having reviewed Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Memoranda and Affidavits filed in 
support and in opposition of said Motion, and having heard 
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argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises 
and good cause appearing therefore, 
THE COURT HEREBY finds.as follows: 
1. There are no bona fide issues of material fact 
precluding the entry of Summary Judgment granting the relief 
sought in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment: (1) 
denying Russell's Petition for Determination of Entitlement 
to Redeem; and (2) quieting title to all of the subject 
property against defendant Roger T. Russell and in favor of 
Plaintiff Mark L. Rindlesbach. 
2. Defendant Russell was not and is not either a 
"judgment debtor" or a "successor to the judgment debtor" 
and therefore lacked the statutory capacity required by Rule 
69 in order to redeem the subject property from the 
Sheriff's Sale. 
3. Defendant Russell was not a creditor holding any 
valid lien on the subject property and therefore lacked the 
statutory capacity required by Rule 69 in order to redeem 
property from the Sheriff's Sale. 
4. ' The acts allegedly performed by Defendant Russell 
in reliance on his asserted oral contract of purchase of 
subject property failed to meet the test of exclusive 
reference, i.e., that they would not have been performed had 
the asserted contract not existed. 
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5. Having acquired all of the subject property for 
good and valuable consideration, Plaintiff Rindlesbach is 
entitled to an Order Quieting Title to the property in his 
name. 
6. Defendant Russell has no legitimate claim to any 
right or interest in the property. 
PURSUANT TO SAID FINDINGS, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be 
and is hereby granted; and 
2. That Defendant Russell's Petition for 
Determination of Entitlement to Redeem be and is hereby 
denied; and 
3. That the Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to 
deliver to Defendant Russell all sums paid into Court on or 
about February 1, 1995, as a tender of Redemption Payment; 
and 
4. That a JUDGMENT AND DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
consistent with the Findings be entered. 
DATED this 3 CL day of VCC^ 1995. 
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APPROVED as to form this 
-^r- day of October, 19 9 5 
David O. Black 
Attorneys for Defendants Hansen 
APPROVED a s t o form t h i s 
J*4 day of Gefeotrer, 19J95: 
William G. Marsde* 
John N. Brems 
Attorneys for Roger T. Russell 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT RUSSELL was mailed, postage prepaid, on 
this day of October, 1995 to the following: 
William G. Marsden 
John N. Brems 
Attorneys for Roger T. Russell 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David Black 
Attorneys for Defendants Hansen 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE 
1245 Brickyard Road, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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TabC 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
1\ RICHARD DAVIS (A0836) 
900 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
RLE* BiSir *T 33URT 
Third J'^ic^i District 
DEC 2 2 1995 
By 
SALT L £ « 4 COUNTY 
Dapuiy ClerK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
MARK L. RINDLESBACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN and 
DIANA M. HANSEN; EVAN W. 
HANSEN, individually and as 
Personal Representative for 
the Estate of GENEVA B. 
HANSEN; ROGER T. RUSSELL; 
and BANK ONE, N.A., formerly 
known as VALLEY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, N.A., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE 
Consolidated 
Civil No. 930906701 
Judge Michael Murphy 
* * * * * * * 
MARK L. RINDLESBACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER T. RUSSELL, also known 
as ROGER T. RUSSELL, DDS; 
DREW WILLIAM HANSEN, also 
known as DREW W. HANSEN, and 
DIANA M. HANSEN; GUARDIAN 
STATE BANK; SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA; UTAH ) 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF ) 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, as ) 
Custodian of the Assets for ) 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK & TRUST ) 
COMPANY and TRACY MORTGAGE ) 
COMPANY; MERRILL G. HANSEN, ) 
also known as MERRILL ) 
HANSEN; KATHLEEN HANSEN; ) 
DARRELL DALTON; UTAH STATE ) 
TAX COMMISSION; and EVAN W. ) 
HANSEN, individually and as ) 
Personal Representative for ) 
the Estate of GENEVA B. ) 
HANSEN, ) 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * 
Based on the Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment 
Against Various Defendants and the Order on Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Russell, the 
Court hereby enters Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Mark L. 
Rindlesbach, and against all Defendants set forth herein as 
follows: 
1. Title to the real property located at 
approximately 1815 East Creek Road South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah particularly described as Exhibit "A" attached hereto, 
is hereby- quieted in the name of Mark L. Rindlesbach. 
2. It is hereby declared that Plaintiff's 
ownership and possession of said property is free and clear 
of all claim of Defendants. 
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3. That Defendants and ail persons claiming by, 
through or under them or any of them are hereby and forever 
barred and foreclosed of all right, title, claim, interest 
in and to the property and each and every part thereof. 
DATED this day of October, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
% 
Misters! K. I VHmgh^ ^ 1 ^ 
District Court Judae 
APPROVED as to form this 
- ^ day of Qstober,—1995: 
Dav4d^0. Black 
Attorneys for Defendants Hansen 
APPROVED as to form this 
/W day of Q^ r^ertner, 1995 
William G. Marsden 
John N. Brems 
Attorneys for Roger T. Russe l l 
EXHIBIT " A 
That certain real property situated in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah more particularly described as 
follows: 
PARCEL 2: 
Beginning South 1193.95 feet, more or less, 
and West 1809.25 feet, more or less, and 
South 75°48'20ff East 100 feet and North 9°16/ 
East 151.84 feet form the Northeast corner of 
Section 33, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 
0°16' East 50 feet; thence North 81°44' West 
55.97 feet; thence South 8°16' West 50 feet; 
thence South 81°44/ East 55.97 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
PARCEL 3: 
Beginning 13 rods West and 61.12 feet North 
and North 75°45' West 40 feet and North 8° 16' 
East 100 feet from center of the Northeast 
quarter of Section 33, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
and running thence North 75°45' West 13 5 
feet; thence North 8°16' East 101.84 feet; 
thence North 81°44' East 41 feet; thence 
South 8°16' West 72 feet; thence Easterly 69 
feet, more or less, to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 4: 
Beginning 214.5 feet West and 61.12 feet 
North from the center of the Northeast 
quarter of Section 33, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence North 75°45' West 4 0.00 
feet; thence North 8°16' East 100.00 feet; 
thence North 51°23/35" West 110.03 feet; 
thence North 8°16/ East 72.00 feet; thence 
North 27°44'30" East 249.55 feet; thence 
South 75°08,28" East 62.24 feet; thence South 
7°30' West 272.00 feet; thence South 66°00' 
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West 2 6.4 feet; thence South 5°30/ West 
174.01 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 5: 
BEGINNING at a point in the center of a 
county road, said point being West 13 rods 
and North 5°30' East 27.08 feet from the 
center of the Northeast quarter of Section 
33, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; and running thence North 
5°30/ East 207.44 feet;thence North 65° East 
26.40 feet; thence North 7°30/ East 308.55 
feet; thence West 295.18 feet to the West 
line of the property described in that 
certain Quit-Claim Deed dated February 24, 
1956, and recorded as Entry No. 1472471 of 
the records of Salt Lake County Recorder; 
thence South 8°16' West 2 31.78 feet; thence 
South 81°44' East 119.97 feet; thence South 
8°16' West 201.84 feet to the center of a 
county road; thence South 75°48'20fl East 
169.12 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING therefrom the following: 
BEGINNING at a point South 75°45'20" East 100 
feet from the Southeast corner of the Salt 
Lake County Water Conservancy District 
property, which is South 1193.95 feet and 
West 1809.25 feet from the Northeast corner 
of Section 33, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point 
is also North 75°48'20" West 101.50 feet and 
north 8°16' East 3 3.18 feet from a County 
Street Monument at the intersection of Little 
Cottonwood Creek Road and Telford way, said 
street monument being 294.8 feet West and 
51.64 feet North from the center of the 
Northeast quarter of said Section 33, and 
running thence North 8°16' East 100 feet; 
thence South 75°45' east 13 5 feet; thence 
South 8°16' West 100 feet; thence North 
75°48/2 0lf West 13 5 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
ALSO, LESS AND EXCEPTING therefrom Parcels 3 
and 4 herein. 
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PARCEL 6: 
BEGINNING at a point which is 253.80 feet 
East of the Northeast corner of Lot 26, 
CABALLERO RANCHES, a subdivision recorded in 
the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder 
and which is a part of Section 33, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence South 08°16' 
West 188.84 feet; thence West 253.80 feet to 
the East line of Lot 26, CABALLERO RANCHES 
SUBDIVISION; thence South 08°16' West 95 
feet; thence East 303.80 feet; thence North 
08°16' East 283.84 feet; thence West 50 feet 
to the point of BEGINNING. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING from all of the above any 
portions lying within the bounds of Little 
Cottoncreek Road. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT AND DFC11EE' gUI ET:i NCi T J TIE war, mailed, 
postage prepaid, on this ZC^day of October, 1995 to the 
following: 
William G. Marsden 
John N. Brems 
Attorneys for Roger T. Russell 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David Black 
Attorneys for Defendants Hansen 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE 
1245 Brickyard Road, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Merrill G. Hansen 
Pro Se 
8160 South Highland Drive, Suite 109 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84093 
Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 
Joseph W. Anderson 
Attorneys for U.S. Small Business Administration 
U.S. Courthouse, Room 478 
3 50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Stephen B. Mitchell 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Guardian State Bank 
.139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jan Graham 
Stephen W. Lewis 
Attorneys for Utah State Tax Commission 
50 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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Darrell Dalton 
1160 North 4500 West 
West Point, Utah 84404 
Kathleen Hansen 
2 69 East Edith Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/jlti M^ftJJL^ir^ 
